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The Southern African Development 
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European Union 
Deepening Integration in Southern Africa? 
Introduction 
Looking at the African continent it is indeed striking that the idea of re-
gional integration is widespread. A total of 14 Inter-Governmental Organi-
zations have developed in Africa to deal with regional integration issues.
1 
The multitude of Regional Integration Initiatives
2 (RIIs) however has re-
sulted in a prevalence of overlapping memberships. Only six African states 
 
1   Cf. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Assessing Regional Integra-
tion in Africa II. Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities, Ethiopia 2006, p. 
xiii. 
2   The prevalent term “Regional Economic Community” (REC) is linked to the idea of 
the African Economic Community and therefore refers first and foremost to eco-
nomic integration. Although in the current literature the term REC does not exclu-
sively refer to the economic dimension of integration, the term is not used in this 
article. Rather, the term “Regional Integration Initiative”, which can also be found 
in the relevant literature (e.g. Philippe de Lombaerde: Supporting Regional Integra-
tion – the Roadmap of Indicators and Tools, UNU-Cris Occasional Papers 0-
2003/3, p. 3), better fits the definition of Regional Integration as a process, and it 
can be applied to organizations regardless of their organization’s scope and depth of 
integration. The term Regional Organization is used synonymously in this paper.  Ariane Kösler 
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belong to one RII exclusively.
3 Accordingly it is no surprise that Southern 
Africa is covered by at least three partly intersecting RIIs:  
•  The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); 
•  The Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
•  The Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
 
Table 1 Overlapping Memberships in RIIs of Southern African States 
Country COMESA*  SADC  SACU  Other 
Angola X  X     
Botswana   X  X   
DR Congo  X  X    CEMAC 
Lesotho   X  X   
Madagascar   X  X    IOC 
Malawi X  X     
Mauritius X  X    IOC 
Mozambique   X     
Namibia X  X  X   
South Africa    X  X   
Swaziland X  X  X   
Tanzania   X    EAC 
Zambia X  X     
Zimbabwe X  X     
*The other member states are: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Sey-
chelles, Sudan and Uganda. 
 
3   Cf. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Assessing Regional Integra-
tion in Africa I, Ethiopia 2004, p. 40. SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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Taking all SADC member states into consideration and thus applying an 
extended definition of Southern Africa, the number of overlapping mem-
berships in that region actually is even larger due to the membership of 
Mauritius and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo belonging also to the Central African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Community (Communauté Economique et Monétaire 
de l’Afrique Central, CEMAC) and Tanzania’s affiliation with the East Af-
rican Community (EAC). The particular levels of cooperation of the differ-
ent RIIs vary substantially and none of them “has been able to produce 
genuine integration”.
4 However, SADC, COMESA, CEMAC and EAC are 
recognized as building blocks by the African Union. Taking into account 
prospect of success and potential for development SADC is considered the 
most important regional organization in Southern Africa.
5  
While the aim of deepening integration in Southern Africa seems quite evi-
dent, the question remains what challenges SADC will face on its way. Af-
ter introducing the organization SADC, this paper addresses the current 
challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa. However, in a global-
izing world, regionalization is never just an internal affair of one world re-
gion. The interrelations with other regions and countries are and have 
always been an influential factor. Therefore this paper also analyses the 
role of SADC’s biggest International Cooperating Partner (ICP), the Euro-
pean Union, in the integration process. Finally, part three explores EU-
SADC relations with a view to its contribution to the objective of deepen-
ing integration. 
 
4   Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, Helsinki 2005, p. 1, 
in: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kmi/english/HannunWP.pdf (29.01.06). 
5   Cf. ibid.; Cf. http://www.afrol.com/articles/16829 (29.01.07). Cf. Stefan Mair: Die 
regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südliche der Sahara, in: 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/NATCA7,0,0,Die_regionale_Integration_und_Ko
operation_in_Afrika_s%FCdlich_der_Sahara.html (29.01.07). Cf. Michael Neu-
mann: Afrikanische Regionalisierung. Rahmenbedingungen und Perspektiven, Ar-
beitspapier Nr. 86/03 des Fachbereichs Wirtschaft der FH-Hannover, November 
2003, p. 28. Ariane Kösler 
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The Southern African Development Community – An 
Overview 
SADC currently has 14 member states representing a population of nearly 
240 million people.
6 The member states differ significantly in their geo-
graphical situations, their economic power and their development status. 
 
Table 2 Comparative Data SADC countries
7 
Member 
States 
Population 
Size (July 
2006 est.) 
Area  
(square 
km) 
HDI 
Rank 
(out of 
177) 
GDP  
(per cap-
ita USD) 
LDC 
status 
Angola 12,127,071    1,246,700 161 2,180  X
Botswana 1,639,833  600,370 131 9,945 
DR Congo  62,660,551  2,345,410 167 705  X
Lesotho 2,022,331  30,355 149 2,619 X
Madagascar 18,595,469  587,040 143 857  X
Malawi 13,013,926  118,480 166 646  X
Mauritius 1,240,827  2,040 63 12,027 
Mozambique 19,686,505  801,590 168 1,237  X
 
6   The population figure is calculated on the accumulated data of the estimated popu-
lation of each SADC member state for July 2006, by the CIA World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (29.01.06). Seychelles withdrew 
their membership in 2004 because “…there was little justification for the money 
Seychelles was expected to contribute to the regional organization annually, espe-
cially at a time it was undergoing difficulties with the shortage of foreign ex-
change.” But Seychelles applied to rejoin in 2006 since its economy has improved 
and the country has increased its activity in international relations. Cf. SADC today, 
Vol. 8, No. 6, February 2006, p. 9. 
7   Figures for Population size and Area from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publi 
cations/factbook/ (4.1.2007), HDI rank and GDP data from http://hdr.undp.org/ 
hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf (04.01.07), LDC status from http://www. 
un.org/ohrlls/ (04.01.07). SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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Namibia 2,044,147  825,418 125 7,418 
South Africa  44,187,637  1,219,912 121 11,192 
Swaziland 1,136,334  17,363 146 5,638 
Tanzania 37,445,392  945,087 162 674  X
Zambia 11,502,010  752,614 165 943  X
Zimbabwe 12,236,805  390,580 151 2,065 
Total 237,718,740  7,634,705 - -  8
 
While the Democratic Republic of Congo covers 62,660,551 square km, 
more than six times the size of Germany, Swaziland and Mauritius only 
comprise 17,363 square km and 2,040 square km, roughly the size of Slo-
venia and Luxembourg respectively. In the Human Development Index 
2006 the SADC member states are ranked between 63/177 (Mauritius) and 
168/177 (Mozambique).
8 Despite being ranked behind Mauritius, South 
Africa is the dominant power in the region economically and politically 
with a GDP per capita of 11,192 USD. According to the latest data on per 
capita income, additional nine countries of the region (Botswana, Mauri-
tius, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mo-
zambique and Zambia) can be qualified as middle income countries. 
However, the latter five countries are still classified in the category Least 
Developed Country (LDC).
9 That means, together with the DR Congo, Ma-
lawi and Tanzania, eight SADC members are LDCs.
10 
 
8   UNDP: Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and 
the global water crisis, New York 2006, p. 284ff.  
9    All countries in the Human Development Report are grouped by income using 
World Bank classifications: high income (gross national income per capita of 
$10,066 or more in 2004), middle income ($826–$10,065) and low income ($825 or 
less). UNDP: Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty 
and the global water crisis, New York 2006, p. 275. GDP data: p. 284ff. The Com-
mittee for Development Policy ”bases its identification of least developed countries 
on criteria designed to measure three dimensions of a country’s state of develop-
ment: (a) its income level, measured by gross national income per capita; (b) its 
stock of human assets, measured by a human assets index; and (c) its economic vul-Ariane Kösler 
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Heterogeneity is thus the first impression of the SADC region. But most of 
the SADC member countries are unified by a common history of British 
colonial rule, which has also led to compatible philosophies of economy, 
traditions of administration
11 and English as the prevailing official lan-
guage. Another unifying element has been the coalition against apartheid 
South Africa, which was the foundation of SADC’s predecessor, SADCC 
(Southern African Development Coordination Conference). Since then, the 
SADC member states have been tied up by the perception that economic 
growth and welfare are only possible through integration in the world mar-
ket, increasing international competitiveness achieved through regional in-
tegration
12  and by a common vision anchored in historical and cultural 
roots. 
Vision, Principles and Common Agenda 
The vision of the Southern African Development Community  
“is one of a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure 
economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of 
life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of 
Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values and 
principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist between the peo-
ples of Southern Africa.”
13  
 
nerability, measured by an economic vulnerability index […] to become eligible for 
graduation a country must meet the threshold for two of the three criteria; to qualify 
for graduation, it must do so in two consecutive triennial reviews.” Committee for 
Development Policy: Report on the sixth session (29 March – 2 April 2004), Eco-
nomic and Social Council, Official Records, 2004, Supplement No. 13, New York 
2004, p. 15, in: http://www.un.org/ohrlls/ (29.01.07). 
10  Cf. List of Least Developed Countries, in: http://www.un.org/ohrlls/ (29.01.06). 
11  Cf. Danko Knothe; Daniel Müller: Ritter von der traurigen Gestalt. Ursachen der 
Governance-Probleme multilateraler Institutionen in Afrika, Hallenser IB-Papier 
2/2006, Halle-Wittenberg 2006, p. 22, in: http://www2.politik.uni-halle.de/rode// 
IBFor2-06.pdf (29.01.07). 
12  Cf. Wolfgang Köhler: Regionalismus neuen Typs, p. 9, in: Akzente, Vol 2, 2004, 
pp. 8-13. 
13  SADC Secretariat: Major Achievements and Challenges. 25-years of Regional Co-
operation and Integration, Gaborone 2005, p. 19. Cf. www.sadc.int/english/about/ 
vision/index.php (29.01.07). SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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The common principles laid down in article four of the SADC Treaty are 
the following: 
•  sovereign equality of all member states;  
•  solidarity, peace and security; 
•  human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 
•  equity, balance and mutual benefit; 
•  peaceful settlement of disputes.
14  
SADC and the member states are supposed to act according to these princi-
ples while pursuing the Common Agenda expressed in article five of the 
Treaty. The agenda which aims at turning the vision into reality is very 
comprehensive in scope. According to this article, SADC aims to promote 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic develop-
ment. Regional integration is envisaged as a means to enhance the standard 
and quality of life of the population and to support the socially disadvan-
taged. Collective self-reliance and the interdependence of member states 
are the basis for the evolution of common political values, systems and in-
stitutions as well as the promotion of peace, security and self-sustained de-
velopment. National and regional strategies shall be harmonized, 
productive employment and programs shall be promoted and maximized, 
natural resources shall be utilized sustainably and the environment shall be 
protected effectively. Further objectives included in article five are the 
crosscutting themes of poverty alleviation (with the ultimate objective of 
eradicating it), the fight against HIV/AIDS, and promotion of gender main-
streaming
15 as well as the strengthening and consolidation of the social, 
cultural and historical affinities and links among the people of the region.  
 
 
 
14  Cf. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 3, Art. 4 Princi-
ples. 
15  Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 3, Art. 5 Objectives. Ariane Kösler 
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History 
In 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) was founded by the so-called Frontline States
16 together with 
Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to reduce their dependency on 
apartheid South Africa, to achieve collective self-reliance and to secure 
support of the International Community. However, the real achievements 
were moderate.
17 In 1992, the organization transformed from a develop-
ment conference into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) before the end of Apartheid in South Africa, which then became a 
SADC-member in 1994.  
The beginning of the development community marked a particularly impor-
tant change in SADC’s orientation: from functional cooperation to devel-
opment integration. This concept differed from regional integration in the 
classical sense of market integration. It rather implied a very close political 
cooperation that developed common programs for different economic areas 
and coordinated economic policies for production, infrastructure and 
trade.
18 Development integration also implied fair distribution of benefits 
and costs of integration
19 as well as cooperation in political and security 
issues. But besides the then established Summit of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment (as the main policy-making institution), the Council of Ministers 
and the permanent Secretariat, the decentralized structure of SADCC lived 
on in sectoral coordinating units and commissions.
20 It was mainly this de-
centralized structure comprising 21 sector coordinating units that proved 
inefficient in the long run because it weakened the SADC Secretariat’s 
 
16  Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. 
17   Cf. Martin Adelmann: SADC vor dem Umbruch: Wird die politische und wirt-
schaftliche Integration im südlichen Afrika gelingen?, Bonn 2005, p. 1, in: libra-
ry.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02807.pdf (29.01.07). 
18  Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: Studie über die zukünftigen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwi-
schen der EU und den Staaten der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrikas 
(SADC), p. 8, in: Dritte Welt Haus Bielefeld; Koordination Südliches Afrika (Eds.): 
SADC zwischen regionaler Integration und reziprokem Freihandel mit der Europäi-
schen Union, Bonn 2000.  
19  Cf. ibid. 
20  Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 8. The scheduled 
tribunal for dispute settlement was not established until 2006.  SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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power, authority and resources required to facilitate regional integration. In 
addition, the sector coordinating units contributed to a lack of regional fo-
cus of the SADC’s Programme of Action. Also their ability to pursue and 
implement policies differed to a great extent.  
Another problem was the ambiguous effects caused by the membership of 
South Africa. On the one hand, the accession of the regional economic su-
perpower was conducive to SADC’s pursuit of genuine regional integration 
in terms of the adoption of legally binding protocols, including the Protocol 
on Trade and Infrastructure.
21 On the other hand, the rivalry between South 
Africa and Zimbabwe turned out to be a hindrance to instead of a facilitator 
of integration.
22 Furthermore, the economic disparities between South Af-
rica and the other member states created fears of South African hegemony, 
slowing down the integration process. Eventually in the late 1990s, even 
the achievements in infrastructural development and in fostering a sense of 
regional belonging could no longer hide the severe problems that ob-
structed substantial successes in regional cooperation and integration. 
Growing divisions within SADC were revealed for example in the failure 
to reach an agreement on the role of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Se-
curity (established in 1996).
23 Nonetheless, SADC did not break down but 
instead in 1999 the Summit directed the Council to initiate a comprehen-
sive review of the operations of SADC institutions, which finally resulted 
in an ambitious restructuring program. It aimed at enabling the SADC se-
cretariat to provide adequate leadership, at ensuring a clearly focused work 
program linked to the overall objectives and at tackling the implementation 
deficit.
24 
 
 
 
21  Cf. ibid., p. 9. 
22  Cf. Martin Adelmann: SADC vor dem Umbruch, p. 2. 
23  Cf. Jan Isaksen; Elling N. Tjønneland: Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Po-
sitions, Policies and Progress, Bergen 2001, p. 4.  
24  Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC’s Restructuring and 
Emerging Policies. Options for Norwegian Support, Bergen 2005, pp. V, 3. Ariane Kösler 
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The New Institutional Structure  
Since the institutional structure of SADC was a primary source of the or-
ganization’s lack of effectiveness and efficiency, its reorganization lay at 
the heart of the reform process. While the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government remained the supreme policy-making institution, other institu-
tions were completely restructured or replaced by newly created ones. In 
contrast to the country-based coordination of sectoral activities and pro-
grams, the new structure, which after more than three years delay is now in 
place, is more centralized. However, the institutional reform still has not 
arranged for any decision-making power on the supranational level: all de-
cisions are taken by consensus between the member states. 
The key element of the reform, the political and practical strengthening of 
the Secretariat, comprises two elements: first, the fusion of the 21 sector 
responsibilities in four directorates (Trade, Industry, Finance and Invest-
ment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Re-
sources; and Social and Human Development and Special Programs) of an 
expanded secretariat. The second main element is the focus of the Secre-
tariat’s activities on economic integration and the mobilization of financial 
resources and a concentration on policy development, harmonization and 
assistance to member states.
25 The core organizational structure now con-
sists of the Executive Secretary’s Office and the Department of Strategic 
Planning, Gender and Development and Policy Harmonization, under 
which the four directorates fall. New in this context is also that the direc-
tors are now chosen by the Secretariat and not by their governments. This 
means that one can expect their first loyalty to be to the Secretariat and 
then to their state of origin.
26 Furthermore, National Committees have been 
established in each Member State for more efficient national coordination 
and implementation of SADC policies. These Committees, composed of 
key stakeholders from the government, private sector and civil society in 
 
25  Cf. ibid., p. 3. 
26  Cf. Wolfgang Köhler: Regionalismus neuen Typs, p. 10.  SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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member states and chaired by the SADC National Contact Points,
 shall 
thereby support that the regional integration process is inclusive.
27  
As previously mentioned, the Summit has remained the supreme decision-
making institution. A new element within the governance structure is the 
Troika, which is built from the current, the incoming and the outgoing 
chairperson. The chair is elected annually. A Troika exists for all bodies of 
governance. It has the responsibility of acting as a Steering Committee to 
ensure fast decision-making and to facilitate timely implementation of de-
cisions as well as to provide policy direction to SADC institutions between 
regular meetings. The Council of Ministers has the authority over two 
newly created institutions: the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), 
which shall provide directions to programs and activities as well as monitor 
and control the implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Devel-
opment Plan (RISDP) and the Standing Committee of Officials, a technical 
advisory committee to the Council.
28  
In the course of the restructuring process SADC has also been granted con-
trol over the formerly semi-independent SADC Organ on Politics, Defense 
and Security Cooperation. However the actual form of that control is not 
yet clear. Initially there was a small administrative unit at the SADC Secre-
tariat. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and 
Security Cooperation (SIPO), decided upon in 2004, originally envisioned 
a Department for Politics, Defense and Security within the Secretariat, 
 
27  Gaolathe to launch National Committee tomorrow, Daily News online, 13 Septem-
ber 2002, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20020913 (29.01.06). „SADC 
National Contact Points are located in the Ministry responsible for all SADC mat-
ters. Their responsibility include regular consultation with and briefings of relevant 
government institutions, the entreprise community and media on matters relating to 
SADC.“ The Southern African Development Community (SADC), p. 2f. in:   
www.ictsd.org/dlogue/1999-02-01/overviewSADC.pdf#search=%22national%20co 
ntact%20points%20sadc%22 (29.01.07). Cf. Martin Adelmann, SADC vor dem 
Umbruch, p. 2. 
28  Cf. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 12 Inte-
grated Committee of Ministers; Cf. www.sadc.int/english/about/brochure/index.php 
(29.01.07); Cf. Munetsi Madakufamba: Council to approve regional programme for 
2006, in: SADC Today, Vol. 8 (2006) No. 6, p. 8; Cf. Treaty of the Southern Afri-
can Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 13 Standing Committee of Officials; Cf. 
www.sadc.int/english/about/brochure/index.php (29.01.07). Ariane Kösler 
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headed by a Chief Director directly responsible to the Executive Secre-
tary.
29 However, in 2005 it was decided to install a fifth directorate within 
the secretariat instead.
30 The directorate, which is headed by a director, re-
ports to the Organ directly through the Executive Secretary,
31 while the 
other directorates are subordinated to one Chief Director as interface to the 
Executive Secretary.
32 The Organ is led by a Troika, which is not equal to 
the Troika of the Summit but annually elected by the Summit. The Ministe-
rial Committee is responsible for the coordination of the work of the Organ 
and its structures. On the working level the Inter-State Defense and Secu-
rity Committee (ISDSC), where the defense and security ministers meet, 
and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), where the 
foreign ministers meet, report to the Ministerial Committee and the Organ 
Troika.  
Since 2006 SADC has also established a tribunal based on article 16 of the 
SADC Treaty.
33 Like the members of the European Court of Justice the ten 
members of the tribunal are selected “from nationals of States who possess 
the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in 
their respective states or who are jurists of recognized competence”.
34 Their 
main responsibility is the arbitration among member states but also the ad-
herence to and the proper interpretation of the SADC Treaty, SADC proto-
cols and all binding instruments adopted within the SADC framework.
35 
 
29  Cf. SADC Secretariat: Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense 
and Security Cooperation, Lesotho 2004, p. 48. 
30  Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC’s Restructuring, p. 6. 
31  Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland: SADC and Donors – Ideals and Practices. From Gabo-
rone to Paris and back, Gaborone 2006, p. 14. 
32  SADC Secretariat: New Secretariat SADC Organisational Structure as approved by 
Council on 25th February 2005, Grand Baie, Republic of Mauritius, in: 
www.sadc.int/english/about/secretariat/sadc%20Structure%205022005.pdf 
(29.01.07).  
33  Cf. SADC establishes Tribunal, in: SADC Today, Vol. 8 (2006) No. 6, p. 4. 
34  Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, Part II Organisation, Art. 
3 Constitution and Composition, in: www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal 
/protcols/tribunal.php (29.01.07). For the European Court of Justice cf. Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Comunity, Art. 223. 
35  Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Ch. 5, Art. 16 The Tribu-
nal. SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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Similar to the rules of procedure before the judicial bodies of the European 
Community, organs and institutions of SADC, its member states as well as 
natural and legal persons are allowed to bring actions against a SADC 
Member State or the Community under the provisions of Part III of the Pro-
tocol on Tribunal.
36 
 
Overview: SADC’s new institutional structure 
 
Another pillar of the reform is the new method of calculating the member-
ship fees. The fee is no longer the same for every single member state. In-
stead each state, depending on its population size and economic power, 
pays at least 5% but maximal 20% of the cumulative membership contribu-
 
36  Cf. Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, Part III Jurisdiction, 
Article 17ff. For the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Bodies of the European 
Community see Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 225ff. 
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tion share of the SADC budget. This is the first step towards a regional 
compensation between South Africa and its poorer neighbours
37 as South 
Africa is the only state contributing 20%.  
The restructuring of the SADC institutions has been the most important and 
labour-intensive activity of the last five years. But not only have the institu-
tions been reformed. Another important and resource consuming element 
of the reform was the development of the RISDP and the SIPO, which 
“identify the main interventions in all areas of regional cooperation and in-
tegration which SADC intends to pursue in the next 15 years.”
38 
RISDP and SIPO – the new policies 
In order to achieve as much consensus as possible on RISDP and SIPO the 
member states undertook national consultations with governmental depart-
ments, the private sector, NGOs, academic and research institutions during 
its development process.
39 The private sector was also involved in the con-
sultations at regional level. The purpose of the consultations was to realign 
priorities, policies and strategies on a regional level.  
SIPO focuses on the sectors of politics, defense, state security and public 
security and identifies objectives for each sector. For those objectives gen-
eral strategies and activities are named. Further policy documents like the 
Mutual Defense Pact and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections supplement SIPO. But still the Organ has to opera-
tionalize, prioritize and develop implementation mechanisms and business 
plans.
40 Despite those challenges, the work program and priorities are de 
facto shaped by some of the SADC institutions.
41 Also, the SADC Organ 
 
37  Cf. Hein Möllers: Regionale Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrika, n. p., 
in: www.issa-bonn.org/laender/sadc.htm (19.01.07). 
38  SADC Executive Secretary, Dr. Tómaz Salomão, Priorities during my office tenure, 
n.p., in: www.sadcreview.com/special_features06/frfeatures.htm (29.01.07). 
39  SADC Executive Secretary DR. Prega Ramsamy Media Briefing, 9 July 2003, Ga-
borone, in: http://www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php?news_id=52 (29.1.07).  
40  Cf Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere. SADC’s restructuring, p. 14. 
41  Cf. ibid., p. 15. “The work on public security (policing) is strongly shaped by the 
existence of SARPCCO, which is active in facilitating technical co-operation be-
tween police agencies in the region. The Organ’s work is also shaped by the gener-SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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has made progress in developing the plans for a peacekeeping brigade as 
part of the African Union (AU) standby force. Further, regional approaches 
in combating small arms proliferation, and in the field of election monitor-
ing are moving ahead. There will be, among other thins, the need of more 
financial support from donors to increase SADC’s technical capacities to 
assist member states in this regard.
42   
Compared to SIPO, the RISDP is already more advanced.
43 The final 
adopted version of the RISDP identifies challenges and priorities, including 
the twelve priority intervention areas. They are of both cross-sectoral and 
sectoral nature and identified as decisive for the realization of SADC’S ob-
jectives, in particular in promoting deeper regional integration, integrating 
SADC into the world economy, promoting balanced and equitable devel-
opment, eradicating poverty, and promoting gender equality.
44 For each of 
these intervention areas the plan lists general and comprehensive strategies 
and activities. But it fails to provide clear regional and operational priori-
ties.
45 Therefore some more, unpublished and restricted documents were 
worked out: the 2004 RISDP Implementation Framework, which provides 
rather detailed 15-year, five-year and one-year (2005-2006) implementa-
tion plans for each of the four directorates, business plans for the director-
ates and a list of priorities and a ranking of existing and potential RISDP 
projects.
46  
By February 2005, 46 projects were listed corresponding to these priorities, 
including 31 projects that have to be implemented by the Secretariat and 15 
 
ally good technical co-operation between the defense forces in the region through 
the working groups of the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee. Importantly, 
the Organ Troika (and in particular it’s current Chair, South Africa) is active in its 
attempts to push the Organ to the centre stage and in turning the Organ Secretariat 
and SIPO into effective instruments.” 
42  Cf. ibid., p. 16. The membership fees make up 39% of the whole SADC budget for 
2007/08.  
43  Cf. ibid., p. 14. 
44   SADC Secretariat: Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP). Executive Sum-
mary, point no. 6, in: http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/summary 
.php?media=print (29.01.07). 
45  Cf. Elling N. Tjønneland; Jan Isaksen; Garth le Pere: SADC’s Restructuring, p. 11. 
46  Cf. ibid. Ariane Kösler 
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that lie in the responsibility of the member states. According to Tjønneland, 
Isaksen and le Pere, “[t]hese documents and emerging priorities show that 
the SADC Secretariat is making serious efforts and progress in giving the 
organization’s social and economic work a sharper regional focus.”
47  
The RISDP and SIPO are thus designed to pursue the overall objective of 
deepening integration, but there is still the question  as to what challenges 
and constraints remain concerning deeper integration in Southern Africa.  
Challenges and constraints to regional integration in 
SADC 
The southern African region faces severe challenges that threaten socio-
economic development. About 90 million people or 40% of the SADC re-
gion’s population live in extreme poverty.
48 Eight of the last 25 ranks of the 
Human Poverty index are SADC member countries.
49 The region has the 
highest proportion of people subsisting on one USD a day in the world.
50 
The main deficiencies are low access to safe drinking water and child mal-
nutrition. Almost half of the member states’ indicators on these two com-
ponents of human poverty are below the regional average.
51  To  reduce 
poverty by half by the year 2015 the region requires a GDP growth of 
6.2%, but even in member states like Botswana and South Africa with high 
GDP growth rates and high per capita rates respectively, the record of pov-
 
47  Cf. ibid, p. 12. 
48  Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 76. On the basis of Indica-
tors such as high levels of malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, underem-
ployment, declining life expectancy, and unsatisfactory access to basic services and 
infrastructures needed to sustain basic human capacities. 
49  UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, p. 294.  
50  Cf. SADC Secretariat, Achievements and Challenges, p. 76. An own calculation on 
the basis of the data of the Human Development Index for the percentages of people 
living with less than one Dollar per day and the CIA World Factbook for the popu-
lation figures for the SADC countries (Angola, Congo, Mauritius and Swaziland 
excluded) revealed a population number of almost 70 million people living with less 
than one Dollar per day.  
51  SADC Secretariat: RISDP, Ch. 2 Socio-economic situation in SADC, 2.4.2 poverty 
situation, in: http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/c2.pdf 
(29.01.07).  SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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erty prevalence remains high.
52 In addition, the division of labour, as well 
as training and education facilities tend to favour men over women.
53 This 
makes females especially vulnerable to poverty and dependent on men. 
Nine of the last 25 ranks of the Gender-related Development Index are held 
by SADC countries.
54 Thirteen of the fourteen SADC countries rank among 
the last 45 out of 136 countries in this index. Poverty in the SADC region is 
also coupled with food insecurity. Food production has increased margin-
ally related to the growth of the population.
55 Although food imports almost 
doubled over the last two years,
56 the situation remains unstable because of 
floods and droughts necessitating humanitarian assistance for many people. 
In 2004 5.4 million people required food assistance. The number of house-
holds running out of food continues to increase.
57 On the whole, food inse-
curity, the lack of employment and low productivity in the SADC region 
are main obstacles to poverty eradication.
58 In addition, increasing levels of 
illiteracy in some SADC countries,
59 and especially the HIV and AIDS epi-
demic contribute to the low human development in the SADC region as the 
 
52  Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 77.  
53  Cf. ibid., p. 77. Cf. UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, p. 363 ff., 371ff. 
54  Cf. UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, p. 366. The Gender-related Devel-
opment Index considers the same indicators as the Human Development index but 
with view to the gender equity. The bigger the gap in quality of life of between men 
and women, the lower the ranking.  
55  Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 77. 
56  Cf. SADC Secretariat: SADC food security update, January 2006, Gaborone 2006, 
in: http://www.sadc.int/english/fanr/food_security/Documents/fs_update/Food%20 
Security%20Update%20-%20Jan%202006-%20fnl.pdf  (29.01.07). SADC Secre-
tariat: SADC food security update, July 2004, Gaborone 2004, in: http:/ 
/www.sadc.int/english/fanr/food_security/food_update_july_2004.php (29.01.07).  
57  Cf. ibid. 
58  Cf. SADC Secretariat: RISDP, 2.4.3 selected health, education and labour indica-
tors, in: http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/c2.pdf 
(29.01.07). The Human Development Report did not give any data for unemploy-
ment rates in the SADC countries therefore exact numbers were not available.  
59  Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. One explanation could be 
high respectively increasing school fees. At least in South Africa sinking enrolment 
rates indicate a correlation. In Mauritius enrolment rates have also decreased, but no 
school fees are raised. However, rising unemployment rates could indicate the need 
for children to work Instead of going to school to support their families. Increasing 
enrolment rates in the other three countries do not allow for substantial explana-
tions.  Ariane Kösler 
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epidemic undermines economic development and exacerbates poverty. Ac-
cording to the latest estimates of UNAIDS, more than 13 million people are 
HIV positive in the SADC region.
60 This makes up to nearly 40 percent of 
all people infected with HIV in the world.  
Apart from those economic, human and social problems, to which regional 
integration hopefully is one answer, there are some major constraints to the 
process of regional integration itself.  
One of the most striking constraints is the political and economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The restrictive policy of head of state Robert Mugabe, whose 
leadership is characterized by a repressive constitutional, legislative and 
electoral tactics, has lured the country into a socio-economic disaster and 
created an enormous refugee problem for neighbouring countries. Also the 
crisis has caused the delay of key infrastructural and economic develop-
ment projects like the construction of a new bridge across the Zambezi 
River.
61 In the field of agriculture, Zimbabwe’s regular livestock epidemics 
pose a long-term threat to the region. Concerning the fiscal policy, the vi-
sion of a common currency remains a chimera as long as high inflation 
rates persist in Zimbabwe.
62 
It is a constraint in general, that although threats to the region’s security are 
mainly internal (concerning governance, human rights and political legiti-
macy), SADC policies in this area still concentrate on traditional military 
security.
63 Therein lies one of the reasons for the often cited lack of politi-
cal will of the member states particularly in deepening political integration. 
The SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections are an 
 
60  Calculated on the figures of UNAIDS: Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2006. 
A UNAIDS 10th Anniversary Special Edition, Geneva 2006, p. 506. 
61  Cf. Southern Africa: Zimbabwe not on SADC heads of state agenda, IRINnews.org, 
17.08.06, in: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=55165&SelectRegion 
=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=SOUTHERN_AFRICA (29.01.07). 
62   Cf. Ibid. The figures for the inflations rates in SADC countries for the years 
2003/2004 already show the bad performance of Zimbabwe with 285% followed by 
Angola with 44% and Madagascar with 27%. The latest data (inflation rate 
1281,1%) clearly points to the disastrous situation that Zimbabwe is facing. SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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important exception to this observation. Although they “[…] add little 
value to the technical management and observation of the elections”, these 
principles and guidelines are a first step in the formulation of a policy that 
is based on the before mentioned principles: “[…] for the first time, they 
publicly commit SADC heads of state/government to proper elections.”
64 
However, the Zimbabwean elections in March 2005 revealed a problem in 
the implementation of these principles. They cannot be enforced as SADC 
lacks the power to impose sanctions against an offending member state. 
South African dominance is another factor that forms an obstacle to re-
gional integration at the moment. On the one hand South Africa is eco-
nomically dominant in the region to such an extant that it is “[…] vital for 
the region to be able to include RSA [Republic of South Africa] in the eco-
nomic integration process.”
65 On the other hand “[o]ne of the conditions 
that increases the likelihood of successful economic integration is that the 
regional partners are more or less on the same level of economic develop-
ment […]”.
66 Given South Africa’s leading position in intra-regional trade, 
economic integration in SADC could possibly thwart trade creation and 
instead lead to polarization.
67 In that case, economic benefits would be 
concentrated on South Africa, while other members would even suffer eco-
nomic losses. Here one reason for the ambivalent relationship between 
South Africa and its neighbours becomes apparent. The other members are 
deeply suspicious that South Africa will take advantage of the reduction of 
tariff barriers
68 because its companies would obtain easy market access in 
other member states while at the same time high non-tariff barriers would 
 
63  Cf. Christian von Soest; Julia Scheller: Regionale Integration im südlichen Afrika: 
Wohin steuert die SADC?, p.6, in GIGA Focus, No. 10, 2006, in http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_afrika_0610.pdf (29.01.07). 
64   Khabele Matlosa: Democratisation at the Crossroads. Challenges for the SADC 
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ISS Paper 118 (2005), 
p.17, in: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/118/Paper118.pdf (29.01.07). 
65  Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 14. 
66  Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 14-15. 
67  Cf. ibid., p. 17. 
68  Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: Tragen wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen (EPAs) zur 
Beseitigung der Armut bei? Die Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union mit den Ariane Kösler 
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protect South African industries from more cost efficient products originat-
ing from other SADC countries.
69 Examples are the textile and the sugar 
industry, which are protected through complicated rules of origin that in-
crease the costs of production and prices of consumption. This raises 
doubts concerning South Africa’s commitment to not pursue its own na-
tional interests to the detriment of its neighbours, and it reduces the will-
ingness of those neighbours to deepen economic integration. Yet there are 
factors that could diminish the likelihood of the polarization effect. Several 
studies have pointed to the possibility that South Africa could instead act as 
a locomotive for the whole region.
70 Instead of the polarization effect or 
after a short period of polarization, the flying geese model is expected to 
prevail. “In this model, the leading country [South Africa] constantly de-
velops new industries and when it loses competitive advantage in a particu-
lar product, it is relocated to its less developed neighbours.”
71 If the flying 
geese model works for SADC, this will also attract more foreign invest-
ment to the region and intraregional investment, fostered by the creation of 
a free trade area, because investors could profit from lower labour costs and 
larger markets.
72 However, this is dependent on many factors, such as the 
given infrastructure and skilled labour capacity.
73  
According to the South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz 
Pahad, “the key driver for development and deeper integration within the 
SADC over the next 15 years is market integration”.
74
 If so, one of the most 
urgent constraints is the already mentioned problem of overlapping mem-
berships. SADC and COMESA are both striving for the implementation of 
a customs union in the near future. SACU is already a customs union. As 
states cannot be members in two different customs unions, overlapping 
 
AKP-Staaten am Beispiel der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des Südlichen Afrika 
(SADC), Bielefeld 2005, p. 37 ff.  
69  Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen, p. 38 f.  
70  Cf. Heinonen Hannu: Economic Integration in Southern Africa, p. 18 f. 
71  Ibid., p. 18. 
72  Cf. ibid., p. 20. 
73  Cf. ibid.  
74  SADC leaders to talk regional integration, in: Mail and Guardian online, 17 August 
2006, in: http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=280977&area=/breaking_ 
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memberships are obstacles to the realization of deeper market integration.
75 
SACU could be a motor for the SADC customs union as starting point that 
would be enlarged by and by.
76 In contrast, COMESA obstructs the imple-
mentation of a SADC customs union because there are still evident tenden-
cies that COMESA wants to pocket SADC and South Africa.  
Having identified the major challenges and constraints to integration in 
SADC integration within in SADC, it is likewise important to examine the 
external relations of SADC as a factor of deeper integration, in particular, 
its relationship to its most significant partner, the European Union.  
The EU-SADC relations – remedying constraints? 
SADC’s pursuit of deeper integration is in line with the EU’s own positive 
experiences with regional integration and the general assumption that re-
gional integration will substantially contribute to welfare in ACP coun-
tries.
77 Consequently, the encouragement of (sub-)regional integration is 
again a key element in the Euro-African partnership for achieving the UN 
Millennium Development Goals and promoting sustainable development, 
security, political reform, economic modernization and good governance in 
Africa.
78 It is this context that the following shall address the actual design 
of the EU-SADC relations and its supportive character.   
The EU-SADC relations can be clustered in three fields of interaction: de-
velopment cooperation, political cooperation and economic cooperation.  
 
 
75  WTO regulations forbid countries from belonging to more than one customs union. 
76  Cf. Christian von Soest; Julia Scheller: SADC, p. 4. 
77  For the general assumption cf. Philippe de Lombaerde: Supporting Regional Inte-
gration – the Roadmap of Indicators and Tools, UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers 0-
2003/3, p. 3. ACP means the group of African Caribbean and Pacific States. 
78  Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament and The European Economic and Social 
Committee. EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Af-
rica’s development, Brussels 2005, p. 3. Council of the European Union: The EU 
and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership, Brussels 2005, p. 2. Ariane Kösler 
24   
Development Cooperation 
The support of the European Union in the field of development cooperation 
aims at creating sustainable development and thus at reducing poverty. 
Consequently all of the aforementioned socio-economic challenges are sub-
ject to EU-SADC development cooperation. 
The financial framework for development cooperation with SADC is the 
European Development Fund (EDF). The funds allocated under the current 
9th EDF to the SADC region for the period 2002-2007 are 101 million Eu-
ros plus 60 million Euros in unspent funds from the previous EDFs. In ad-
dition, the individual member countries of SADC receive bilateral 
assistance from the EU member states. If those funds are taken together, 
the European Union proves to be the biggest single donor to the SADC re-
gion.
79 However, the individual EU member states still have their own de-
velopment programmes with SADC and its member countries. 
Additionally, for the period 2008-2013 the European Union has planned for 
the allocation of 135 million Euros under the 10th EDF for development 
cooperation with SADC. 
The strategy of the EU-SADC development cooperation is laid down in a 
Regional Strategy Paper and the Regional Indicative Plan (RIP) by the EU. 
Those plans cover the same period as the 9th EDF. The RIP was developed 
before the RISDP was adopted but is nevertheless compatible to it in most 
of its development objectives, especially the economic integration time-
frame.
80 The two focus areas of the current RIP are regional integration and 
trade as well as transport and communication. Both sectors receive 35-45% 
of total funds. While support in these sectors aims at improving the eco-
nomic situation, there are also several interventions designed to directly 
address social areas in which SADC faces major development challenges. 
There are several projects in the food, agriculture and natural resources sec-
tor, for example the “SADC Land and Water Management Resource Pro-
gramme”, which started in March 2003 and a project on regional 
 
79  Cf. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd.; SADC Secretariat (Eds.): Official 
SADC trade, industry and investment review 2005, Gaborone 2005, p. 30. 
80  Cf. ibid., p. 30. SADC and its Relations to the EU 
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integration in the SADC livestock sector, which also started in 2003. Both 
projects have the goal to increase crop or livestock production. Other pro-
grammes like the “Southern African Animal Disease Control Programme“ 
or the “Implementation and Coordination of Agricultural Research and 
Training in the SADC Region” also contribute to the overall objective of 
poverty alleviation.
81 Another non-focal area of the RIP is the intra-regional 
development of human skills and education and training institutions. The 
RIP also supports a programme to increase awareness for HIV/AIDS, 
HIV/AIDS education and prevention. The Project “Regional Support for 
Multi-Sectoral Response to HIV/AIDS” that started already under the 8th 
EDF is continued. While the overall objective is a reduced number of 
HIV/AIDS infected and affected persons and the remedying of HIV/AIDS, 
also a constraint to socio-economic development, the concrete project pur-
pose is to increase the secretariat’s capacity in identifying and supporting 
measures against HIV/AIDS and in promoting appropriate policies and 
practices on the epidemic.
82  
Besides those measures, EU-SADC development cooperation also com-
prises support to capacity building of the SADC secretariat. One of the pro-
jects under the 9th EDF has entailed the recruitment of seven long-term 
experts and the provision of financial support to strengthen the secretariat’s 
abilities in implementing and monitoring SADC protocols and in making 
effective use of information technology. Another project assists the secre-
tariat and policy-makers from the region to participate more effectively in 
the WTO negotiations on services and to liberalise and increase intra-
regional trade in services. Thus, development cooperation between SADC 
and the EU helps deepen integration through assistance in addressing the 
socio-economic problems that SADC has to face. But it also deepens inte-
gration directly through the support of the regional organization’s capaci-
ties. 
 
 
81 Cf. ibid., p. 32. 
82 Cf. ibid., p. 33. Ariane Kösler 
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Political Cooperation 
On the political level the dialogue between SADC and the EU has been in-
stitutionalized through a Declaration, commonly called Berlin Initiative, 
which was the result of the first EU-SADC ministerial meeting in 1994 in 
Berlin. The objectives of the dialogue were to contribute to peace, democ-
racy and sustainable development. Regular meetings on the level of senior 
officials in preparation of a ministerial conference every two years were 
considered necessary. As a result of the first meeting it was agreed upon to 
cooperate in several fields, such as regional integration, trade and economy, 
private investment and development, including infrastructure, health, com-
bating international crime and others. Since then, six ministerial confer-
ences have taken place: in Windhoek 1996, in Vienna 1998, in Gaborone 
2000, in Maputo 2002, in The Hague 2004 and in Maseru 2006. 
In 2002 at the Maputo Conference its structure was revised in order to 
make the Conference and the EU-SADC partnership more efficient.
83 One 
consequence was that the meeting in The Hague took place in the EU-
SADC Double Troika format. The meeting was attended only by the minis-
ters and representatives of the SADC Troika and the Troika of the Organ 
on Politics, Defense and Security plus the SADC secretariat and the EU 
Troika.
84 But the format of the conferences has been subject to further dis-
cussions since, and no formal agreement on this issue has been reached yet. 
The EU-SADC meetings have always been an instrument of information 
exchange on the latest developments in the regions in all areas of interest 
and to criticize stagnating progress or certain policies. Prevailing subjects 
of the last meeting were the fight against HIV/AIDS, the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the issues of sustainable peace 
and security, good governance and democracy, trade and economic liber-
alization, including EPA negotiations, infrastructure support and the outline 
 
83  Cf. ibid., p. 27. 
84  The EU Troika that attends the ministerial meeting always consists of the current 
and the following chair of the European Union and the European Commission plus 
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for the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Program.
85 Also, during the last 
meeting in Maseru, the EU and SADC discussed possibilities for strength-
ening democratic institutions in the region and in particular the capacity of 
the SADC Secretariat to observe and strengthen the electoral processes in 
member states. The potential for collaboration between similar institutions 
in the EU and SADC with a view to sharing information on best practices 
in the management of electoral processes was also debated. This can be in-
terpreted as a sign that the political dialogue between the EU and SADC 
helps to set and to keep domestic affairs on the SADC agenda. 
Accordingly, several conferences, workshops, seminars and programs on 
matters of regional concern, like HIV/AIDS or drugs and the funding for a 
number of special political projects like SADC’s work on small arms have 
been the output of the Berlin initiative.  
Another field of political cooperation is security and peace. In this area the 
EU has undertaken a horizontal initiative, the financial support of an Afri-
can Peace Facility set up by the African Union. The AU or a sub-regional 
organization like SADC with the political approval of the AU can initiate a 
request for financing from this facility. Indirectly though, the political co-
operation of the EU is extended to the support of a SADC Standby Force 
which is currently under preparation.  
One effect of the institutionalization of the political cooperation between 
SADC and the EU is certainly the improvement of reciprocal understand-
ing,
86 although the dispute over the Zimbabwean case may provide a differ-
ent picture.  
As Robert Mugabe turned despotic over the last years, expelling white 
farmers from their farms and suppressing democracy for the Zimbabwean 
people on the whole, the EU states called upon SADC to strongly condemn 
such policies and to take sanction measures. But the SADC states, where 
many leaders were traditional allies of Mugabe in the anti-colonialism 
 
85  Communiqué for the SADC-EU Double Troika Ministerial Meeting 17 November 
2006 Maseru, the Kingdom of Lesotho, 17 November 2006, in: 
http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/other_documents/vko46/en_GB/11637
80592389/ (29.01.07). 
86 Cf. Official SADC trade, industry and investment review 2005, p. 27. Ariane Kösler 
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struggle, neglected to react in such a harsh way. Instead, SADC leaders, 
especially Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, have engaged in quiet diplomacy, 
trying to positively influence Mugabe behind closed doors. This approach 
has been widely questioned.
87 But now that it has become obvious that 
Mugabe’s strategy has led to a catastrophic reversal in economic develop-
ment, most heads of state and government are more willing to take a 
stricter stance on Zimbabwe. A sign for this development seems to be the 
early departure of Mugabe from the SADC Summit in Lesotho in 2006. At 
the summit the other SADC leaders criticized Mugabe’s policies in the con-
text of economic development, and said investors had been scared away 
from the region.
88 Still, it is unclear to which extent the session on Zim-
babwe during the Lesotho Summit put pressure on Mugabe, especially in 
light of his latest announcements to extend his presidential term for two 
more years. That would mean that the next presidential elections would 
take place in 2010 together with the next elections of the parliament. How-
ever, in contrast to the EU, SADC is very unlikely to undertake any sanc-
tions.
89 After all, this would require unanimity, and of course Zimbabwe 
will not impose sanctions on itself.  
Economic Cooperation 
Economic cooperation is an important pillar of EU-SADC relations since 
the EU is the most important trading partner of the SADC region. The EU 
receives 42% of SADC exports and is the region of origin of 39% of SADC 
imports.
90 The trade relations with SADC are based on the Cotonou Part-
nership Agreement of 2000. This successor to the Lomé Agreements 
defines the fostering of smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states 
into the global economy as the objective of economic and trade coopera-
 
87  Moyiga Nduru: “We want to show all is not well in Zimbabwe” – SADC protestors, 
Inter Press Service News Agency, 17 August 2006, in: http://ipsnews. 
net/news.asp?idnews=34381 (29.01.07). 
88    Mugabe leaves SADC summit in a huff, Zim Online, 21 August 2006, in: 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/aug21_2006.html (29.01.07). 
89  The SADC Treaty provides for different possibilities of sanctions in Art. 33, from 
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tion. Since regional integration is seen as a key instrument for the integra-
tion of ACP countries into the world economy, the Cotonou Agreement 
considers cooperation with RIIs an important element for the enhancement 
of the production, supply and trading capacity of the ACP countries as well 
as their capacity to attract investment.
91 Since the arrangements under the 
Lomé Agreements did not increase the competitiveness of the ACP coun-
tries substantially, the Cotonou Agreement provides for a new type of re-
gional trading arrangements known as Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). These EPAs are WTO-compatible and envisage the creation of 
larger economic areas “with stable, predictable and transparent regulatory 
frameworks”.
92 They are the dominant issue in EU-SADC trade relations at 
the moment. The negotiations on an EPA with SADC started in July 2004. 
The target date for the entry into force of the EPA is January 2008. How-
ever, EPA negotiations have struggled with two of the aforementioned con-
straints to regional integration in SADC: namely, the dominance of South 
Africa and the overlapping memberships in different RIIs. Both problems 
become clearly visible in the composition of the SADC-EPA group which 
negotiates the EPA with the EU. Instead of all SADC member states, only 
the SACU-members Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland plus An-
gola, Mozambique and Tanzania belong to the SADC-EPA group. South 
Africa has observer status. The remaining SADC members negotiate in the 
Eastern and Southern Africa-EPA group (ESA), which was initiated by 
COMESA. The ESA negotiations already started in February 2004.  
It is difficult to assess which impact the EU-SADC trade relations have on 
deeper integration in SADC. On the one hand EPAs are seen as capable of 
fostering regional integration because an internal SADC free trade area is 
needed for the implementation of a common free trade agreement with the 
EU.
93 After all, the objective that the EPAs enter into force in 2008 coin-
 
90  Cf. http://www.delbwa.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_sadc/introduction.htm (23.11.06). 
91  Sanoussi Bilal; Francesco Rampa: Alternative (to) EPAs. Possible Scenarios for the 
future ACP relations with the EU, Maastricht 2006, p. 14. 
92  Cf. SADC Secretariat, Major Achievements and Challenges, p. 81. 
93  Cf. What is an EPA? in: Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd.; SADC Secre-
tariat (Eds.): The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2005, p. 
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cides with SADC’s genuine time frame for deepening economic integra-
tion, i.e., with the envisaged implementation of a SADC free trade area. In 
addition, the EPA negotiations necessitate a fast-track implementation of 
the trade protocol in order to prepare the member states’ economic, social 
and institutional infrastructures to adequately cushion the expected adjust-
ment impacts associated with the EPAs.
94 For that reason, the EPAs give a 
strong incentive to realize the next steps (free trade area and customs un-
ion) in economic integration without delay. On the other hand, the EU is 
pushing for the realization of a SADC customs union by 2008.
95 This pres-
sure from EPA negotiations could lead to excessive demands on SADC 
capacities and thus to the failure of the attempt to fast-track the Trade Pro-
tocol implementation. This, in turn, could result in the exact opposite of the 
EPA reasoning, namely socio-economic hardships that make economic 
convergence, and thus integration, even more difficult.  
In addition, the split of member states into two EPA groups, as well as 
South Africa’s absence, are viewed as impediments to integration of 
SADC. South Africa is a special case because it already negotiated a recip-
rocal trade agreement (Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement, 
TDCA) with the EU bilaterally. Moreover, the EPA negotiations would 
lead to the existence of three different free trade agreements of SADC 
countries with the EU if there is no change in the composition of the nego-
tiating parties. The SADC-EPA group faces the difficulty that, because of 
membership in SACU, some countries are already affected by the TDCA. 
In order to secure the functioning of the EPA, this would imply that either 
all conditions of the TDCA would have to be taken over or the SADC-EPA 
countries would have to protect their borders against the crossing of all 
products which were imported under the TDCA rules into the region.
96 The 
first option is nearly impossible because of the difficult time frame. The 
TDCA conditions must be met in 2012 while the EPAs shall enter into 
force in 2008 so that only four years are left for the other countries to re-
 
94  Cf. SADC Secretariat: Achievements and Challenges, p. 81. 
95  ECDPM: Update on regional EPA negotiations. ESA - EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement (ECDPM InBrief 15F), Maastricht 2006. 
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duce all import duties to zero.
97 Also, it seems less of a good deal for the 
less advanced economies of the SADC-EPA to take over the conditions of 
a free trade agreement between South Africa and the EU. The latter option 
could thwart deeper integration in the SADC region. In this context the EU-
South Africa trade relations have rather exacerbated the difficulties be-
tween SADC and South Africa instead of contributing to a solution.  
The splitting of SADC member states to the SADC and the ESA groups 
leads to three future scenarios. The first is that COMESA and SADC would 
build one free trade area and agree on the same external tariffs;
98 this im-
plies difficult negotiations.
99 Alternatively, complicated rules of intrare-
gional trade would need to be implemented if the countries remained 
members in both organizations and in two different EPA arrangements.
100 
This would split SADC economically and would hinder deeper economic 
integration. However, in March 2006, a tripartite meeting of COMESA, 
SADC and EAC countries took place. On this occasion, the present minis-
ters recommended the harmonization of their EPA negotiating positions, 
the coordination of their positions on tariffs, including their phase-down 
and their stance on sensitive products. The last scenario would be a change 
of mind of the double members according to their historical and political 
links towards the SADC customs union and the SADC-EPA.
101 Then 
COMESA and the ESA-EPA would only comprise the East African states 
and thus essential equate to the termination of double memberships. How-
ever, the advantage would be a clear division between Eastern and South-
ern African States. While the last option seemed to be very difficult to 
realize in the past, there has been some movement recently regarding the 
question of overlapping memberships. At the last Summit in Maseru, Leso-
tho, a Task Force was established to propose measures for fast-tracking the 
implementation of the SADC integration agenda (free trade area in 2008 
and customs union in 2010). The task force was to report to the Extra Ordi-
 
97  Cf. Gottfried Wellmer: wirtschaftliche Partnerschaftsabkommen, p. 42. 
98  SACU and EAC would also need to agree to that one free trade agreement. 
99  Cf. Martin Adelmann: SADC vor dem Umbruch, p. 7. 
100 Cf. ibid. 
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nary Summit held in October 2006, which was planned for scaling up the 
implementation of the SADC integration agenda (although the Task Force 
had not progressed as much as had been envisioned).  
Another complication to the EPA negotiations comes from the “Everything 
but Arms-Initiative” (EBA), which provides for full duty and quota-free 
access to the European markets for products from LDCs, but with no time-
limit to do so. The SADC-EPA group has requested that its LDCs, Angola, 
Mozambique and Tanzania, remain in a permanent EBA status under a fu-
ture EPA. However, the EU has voiced concerns on this in the light of the 
phase-out of the WTO-waiver for the EBA provisions starting the first 
January 2008.  
Conclusions 
Deepening integration in the SADC region means to realize the objectives 
of the RISDP and SIPO. With a reorganized institutional structure in place, 
SADC is hopefully in a better position to address its challenges and to 
tackle the constraints to regional integration. If it succeeds in building ca-
pacity in management, planning and monitoring, the foundation for a more 
efficient and effective cooperation between the member states can be estab-
lished.
102 Especially the establishment of the Tribunal could prove an im-
portant driving force of integration because for the first time a mechanism 
for the settlement of disputes is in place. The lack of which was seen as a 
hindrance to deeper integration because the fear of arbitrary arrangements 
between the more powerful states would result in tentative reforms.
103  
While EU-SADC relations are undoubtedly helpful if socio-economic chal-
lenges are concerned, key problems like the South African dominance have 
been rather worsened. The pursuit of the EU’s own trade interests, which 
have led to the accomplishment of the TDCA, have complicated the situa-
tion in Southern Africa and reveal the incoherence of the EU’s policy to-
wards Southern Africa. Despite these shortcomings of the EU-SADC 
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relationship one cannot conclude that the road towards deeper integration is 
inaccessible. Dieter and Melber found in 2000, that regional integration in 
SADC, contrary to the then prevalent impression, could “well be qualified 
less negatively as ‘regional integration in ferment’”.
104 This remains true in 
2006: the Community is in motion. Besides the adoption of the Protocol on 
Finance and Investment in October 2006, which is an important step in the 
realization of economic integration,
105 the fact that the Zimbabwean crisis 
was indeed debated at the last Summit is a sign that SADC leaders no 
longer accept Mugabe’s policies. After the cruel treatment of Zimbaweans 
opposition leader Tsvangirai South Africa even moved beyond quite di-
plomacy by urging Harare to respect the rights of all Zimbabweans and 
(party) leaders. In addition, the implementation of a task force, the conven-
ing of the extraordinary Summit and the tripartite meeting prove that the 
political will exists to reach deeper market integration and to eventually 
think about the abolishing of overlapping memberships. The contribution 
of EU-SADC relations here has certainly fostered a continuous dialogue 
and provided new incentives. So it seems that deeper integration in SADC 
needs impulses from the outside that include further support of the interna-
tional donor community, especially of the EU. However, it is also impor-
tant that SADC members take a stronger common stand towards the EU 
and that they align their bilateral policies with the multilateral SADC poli-
cies. This is necessary to oppose incoherent cooperation approaches of the 
EU from the very beginning as well as to propose and enforce mechanisms 
for resolution, whether popular or not, i.e. the annulment of the TDCA. 
SADC member states also need to ensure that SADC’s capacities are not 
exhausted and that a genuine time frame can be followed. After all, the 
process of regional integration in the European Union has shown that deep-
ening integration is also a matter of time.  
 
104 Heribert Dieter; Henning Melber: Not Future For SADC? Perspectives for Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa after the Mauritius Summit, INEF Report, 43 (2000), 
p. 27. 
105 It pursues harmonization of policies on taxation, investment, development finance, 
stock exchanges, insurance, exchange control payments and clearing systems and 
macroeconomic convergence. Ariane Kösler 
34   
Abbreviations 
ACP    Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries 
AU   African  Union 
CEMAC  Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Central 
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
EAC   East  African  Community 
EBA    Everything but Arms initiative 
EDF    European Development Fund 
EPA   Economic  Partnership  Agreement 
ESA    Eastern and Southern Africa 
ICM    Integrated Committee of Ministers 
IOC   Indian  Ocean  Commission 
ISDSC Inter-State  Defense  and Security Committee 
ISPDC  Inter-State Politics and Diplomatic Committee 
LDC    Least Developed Country 
RII   Regional  Integration  Initiative 
RIP    Regional Indicative Plan 
RISDP  Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
RSA    Republic of South Africa 
SACU  Southern African Customs Union 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
SADCC  Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
SIPO  Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense 
and Security Cooperation 
TDCA  Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
C  1 (1998)  Frank Ronge (Hrsg.) 
Die baltischen Staaten auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union 
C  2 (1998)  Gabor Erdödy 
Die Problematik der europäischen Orientierung Ungarns 
C  3 (1998)  Stephan Kux 
Zwischen Isolation und autonomer Anpassung: Die Schweiz im 
integrationspolitischen Abseits? 
C  4 (1998)  Guido Lenzi 
The WEU between NATO and EU 
C  5 (1998)  Andreas Beierwaltes 
Sprachenvielfalt in der EU – Grenze einer Demokratisierung Europas?  
C  6 (1998)  Jerzy Buzek 
Poland’s Future in a United Europe 
C  7 (1998)  Doug Henderson 
The British Presidency of the EU and British European Policy 
C  8 (1998)  Simon Upton 
Europe and Globalisation on the Threshold of the 21st Century.  
A New Zealand Perspective 
C  9 (1998)  Thanos Veremis 
Greece, the Balkans and the European Union 
C 10 (1998)  Zoran Djindjic 
Serbiens Zukunft in Europa 
C 11 (1998)  Marcus Höreth 
The Trilemma of Legitimacy. Multilevel Governance in the EU and  
the Problem of Democracy 
C 12 (1998)  Saadollah Ghaussy 
Japan and the European Union 
C 13 (1998)  Walter Schweidler 
Bioethische Konflikte und ihre politische Regelung in Europa 
C 14 (1998)  Wolfgang Ischinger 
Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Amsterdam 
C 15 (1998)  Kant K. Bhargava 
EU – SAARC: Comparisons and Prospects of Cooperation 
C 16 (1998)  Anthony J. Nicholls 
Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen: Ein hoffnungsloser Fall? 
C 17 (1998)  Nikolaj Petersen 
The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam 
C 18 (1998)  Aschot L. Manutscharjan 
Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven 
C 19 (1998)  Stefan Fröhlich 
Der Ausbau der europäischen Verteidigungsidentität zwischen WEU und NATO 
C 20 (1998)  Tönis Lukas 
Estland auf dem Weg aus der totalitären Vergangenheit zurück nach Europa 
C 21 (1998)  Wim F. van Eekelen 
Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU 
C 22 (1998)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa in den Kräftefeldern des 21. Jahrhunderts.  
C 23 (1998)  Marco Bifulco 
In Search of an Identity for Europe 
C 24 (1998)  Zbigniew Czachór 
Ist Polen reif für die Europäische Union? 
C 25 (1998)  Avi Primor 
Der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und die Rolle der Europäischen Union 
C 26 (1998)  Igor Leshoukov 
Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration 
C 27 (1998)  Dirk Rochtus 
Die belgische „Nationalitätenfrage“ als Herausforderung für Europa  
C 28 (1998)  Jürgen Rüttgers 
Europa – Erbe und Auftrag 
C 29 (1999)  Murat T. Laumulin 
Die EU als Modell für die zentralasiatische Integration? 
C 30 (1999)  Valdas Adamkus 
Europe as Unfinished Business: The Role of Lithuania  
in the 21
st Century‘s Continent 
C 31 (1999)  Ivo Samson 
Der widerspruchsvolle Weg der Slowakei in die EU.  
C 32 (1999)  Rudolf Hrbek / Jean-Paul Picaper / Arto Mansala 
Deutschland und Europa. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Perspektiven 
C 33 (1999)  Dietrich von Kyaw 
Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des  
Europäischen Rates in Wien 
C 34 (1999)  Hagen Schulze 
Die Identität Europas und die Wiederkehr der Antike 
C 35 (1999)  Günter Verheugen 
Germany and the EU Council Presidency 
C 36 (1999)  Friedbert Pflüger 
Europas globale Verantwortung – Die Selbstbehauptung der alten Welt 
C 37 (1999)  José María Gil-Robles 
Der Vertrag von Amsterdam: Herausforderung für die Europäische Union 
C 38 (1999)  Peter Wittschorek 
Präsidentenwahlen in Kasachstan 1999 
C 39 (1999)  Anatolij Ponomarenko 
Die europäische Orientierung der Ukraine 
C 40 (1999)  Eduard Kukan 
The Slovak Republic on its Way into the European Union 
C 41 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa auf der Suche nach einer neuen geistigen Gestalt 
C 42 (1999)  Simon Green 
Ausländer, Einbürgerung und Integration: Zukunftsperspektive der  
europäischen Unionsbürgerschaft? 
C 43 (1999)  Ljerka Mintas Hodak 
Activities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the Process of  
European Integration 
C 44 (1999)  Wolfgang Schäuble 
Unsere Verantwortung für Europa 
C 45 (1999)  Eric Richard Staal 
European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma 
C 46 (1999)  Marek J. Siemek 
Demokratie und Philosophie 
C 47 (1999)  Ioannis Kasoulides 
Cyprus and its Accession to the European Union 
C 48 (1999)  Wolfgang Clement 
Perspektiven nordrhein-westfälischer Europapolitik 
C 49 (1999)  Volker Steinkamp 
Die Europa-Debatte deutscher und französischer Intellektueller nach dem  
Ersten Weltkrieg 
C 50 (1999)  Daniel Tarschys 
50 Jahre Europarat 
C 51 (1999)  Marcin Zaborowski 
Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement 
C 52 (1999)  Romain Kirt 
Kleinstaat und Nationalstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
C 53 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Die Zukunft des europäischen Einigungsgedankens  
C 54 (1999)  Lothar Rühl 
Conditions and options for an autonomous „Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence“ in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective 
opened at Cologne in June 1999 
C 55 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Möglichkeiten einer engeren Zusammenarbeit in Europa am Beispiel  
Deutschland - Slowakei 
C 56 (1999)  Rafael Biermann 
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - potential, problems and  
perspectives 
C 57 (1999)  Eva Slivková 
Slovakia’s Response on the Regular Report from the European Commission  
on Progress towards Accession 
C 58 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Ed.) 
A Pledge for an Early Opening of EU-Accession Negotiations 
C 59 (1999)  Ivo Sanader 
Croatia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership 
C 60 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europas Identität und die Kraft des Christentums 
C 61 (2000)  Kai Hafez 
The West and Islam in the Mass Media 
C 62 (2000)  Sylvie Goulard 
Französische Europapolitik und öffentliche Debatte in Frankreich 
C 63 (2000)  Elizabeth Meehan 
Citizenship and the European Union 
C 64 (2000)  Günter Joetze 
The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
C 65 (2000)  Lutz Rathenow 
Vom DDR-Bürger zum EU-Bürger 
C 66 (2000)  Panos Kazakos 
Stabilisierung ohne Reform 
C 67 (2000)  Marten van Heuven 
Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
C 68 (2000)  Carlo Masala 
Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft 
C 69 (2000)  Weltachsen 2000/World Axes 2000. A documentation 
C 70 (2000)  Gert Maichel 
Mittel-/Osteuropa: Warum engagieren sich deutsche Unternehmen? 
C 71 (2000)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Die Bürgergesellschaft als ein Motor der europäischen Integration 
C 72 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Henri Ménudier/Janusz Reiter 
Das Weimarer Dreieck 
C 73 (2000)  Ramiro Xavier Vera-Fluixa 
Regionalbildungsansätze in Lateinamerika und ihr Vergleich mit der Europäischen 
Union 
C 74 (2000)  Xuewu Gu (Hrsg.) 
Europa und Asien: Chancen für einen interkulturellen Dialog? 
C 75 (2000)  Stephen C. Calleya 
Is the Barcelona Process working? 
C 76 (2000)  Àkos Kengyel 
The EU´s Regional Policy and its extension to the new members  
C 77 (2000)  Gudmundur H. Frìmannsson 
Civic Education in Europe: Some General Principles 
C 78 (2000)  Marcus Höreth 
Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? 
C 79 (2000)  Franz-Joseph Meiers 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität (ESVI) oder Gemeinsame 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP)? C 80 (2000)  Gennady Fedorov 
Kaliningrad Alternatives Today 
C 81 (2001)  Ann Mettler 
From Junior Partner to Global Player: The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint 
Action Plan 
C 82 (2001)  Emil Minchev 
Southeastern Europe at the beginning of the 21
st century 
C 83 (2001)  Lothar Rühl 
Structures, possibilities and limits of European crisis reaction forces for conflict 
prevention and resolution 
C 84 (2001)  Viviane Reding 
Die Rolle der EG bei der Entwicklung Europas von der Industriegesellschaft zur 
Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft 
C 85 (2001)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Towards Europe 2007. Identity, Institution–Building and the Constitution of Europe
C 86 (2001)  Janusz Bugajski 
Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010 
C 87 (2001)  Frank Ronge / Susannah Simon (eds.) 
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities in Europe 
C 88 (2001)  Ralf Elm 
Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie 
C 89 (2001)  Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The Big Leap to the West: The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
C 90 (2001)  Valérie Guérin-Sendelbach (Hrsg.) 
Interkulturelle Kommunikation in der deutsch-französischen  
Wirtschaftskooperation 
C 91 (2001)  Jörg Monar  
EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of 
Diversity and EU Instruments and Strategies 
C 92 (2001)  Michael Gehler 
Finis Neutralität? Historische und politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: 
Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Österreich 
C 93 (2001)  Georg Michels 
Europa im Kopf – Von Bildern, Klischees und Konflikten 
C 94 (2001)  Marcus Höreth 
The European Commission’s White Paper Governance: A ‘Tool-Kit’ for closing the 
legitimacy gap of EU policymaking? 
C 95 (2001)  Jürgen Rüland 
ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Interregional Relationship 
C 96 (2001)  Bo Bjurulf 
How did Sweden Manage the European Union? 
C 97 (2001)  Biomedizin und Menschenwürde. 
Stellungnahmen von Ulrich Eibach, Santiago Ewig, Sabina Laetitia Kowalewski, 
Volker Herzog, Gerhard Höver, Thomas Sören Hoffmann und Ludger Kühnhardt 
C 98 (2002)  Lutz Käppel 
Das Modernitätspotential der alten Sprachen und ihre Bedeutung für die Identität 
Europas 
C 99 (2002)  Vaira Vike-Freiberga 
Republik Lettland und das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen – Partner in einem vereinten 
Europa 
C 100 (2002)  Janusz Musial 
Periodische Arbeitsmigration aus Polen (Raum Oppeln) nach Deutschland. Ein 
Testfall für die Erwerbswanderungen nach der Osterweiterung? 
C 101 (2002)  Felix Maier (Hrsg.) 
Managing asymmetric interdependencies within the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship. 
C 102 (2002)  Hendrik Vos 
The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken 
C 103 (2002)  Helmut Kohl 
Der EURO und die Zukunft Europas C 104 (2002)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
The Lakes of Europe 
C 105 (2002)  Katharina von Schnurbein 
Der tschechische EU-Beitritt: Politischer Prozeß wider die öffentliche Meinung 
C 106 (2002)  Andrew Dennison 
Shades of Multilateralism. U.S. Perspectives on Europe’s Role in the War on Ter-
rorism 
C 107 (2002)  Boris Hajoš et.al. 
The Future of the European Integration Process: Ideas and Concepts of Candidate 
Countries 
C 108 (2002)  Hans von der Groeben 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 109 (2002)  Emil Mintchev /Klaus Bünger 
A Sustained Economic Revival in Kosovo. Need for a Liberal Concept 
C 110 (2002)  Michael Lochmann 
Die Türkei im Spannungsfeld zwischen Schwarzmeer-Kooperation und Europäi-
scher Union 
C 111 (2002)  Indra de Soysa / Peter Zervakis (eds.) 
Does Culture Matter? The Relevance of Culture in Politics and Governance in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Zone 
C 112 (2002)  José Manuel Martínez Sierra 
The Spanish Presidency. Buying more than it can choose? 
C 113 (2002)  Winfried Loth 
Europäische Identität in historischer Perspektive 
C 114 (2002)  Hansjörg Eiff 
Serbien – zwei Jahre nach Milosevics Sturz 
C 115 (2002)  Peter Doyle 
Ireland and the Nice Treaty 
C 116 (2002)  Stefan Fröhlich 
Das Projekt der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 
(GESVP): Entwicklungen und Perspektiven 
C 117 (2003)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Welche Grenzen setzt die Globalisierung der europäischen Integration? 
C 118 (2003)  Franz-Josef Meiers (Hrsg.) 
Die Auswirkungen des 11. September 2001 auf die transatlantischen Beziehungen
C 119 (2003)  Hubert Iral 
Between Forces of Inertia and Progress: Co-decision in EU-Legislation 
C 120 (2003)  Carlo Masala (ed.) 
September 11 and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation 
C 121 (2003)  Marcus Höreth 
When Dreams Come True: The Role Of Powerful Regions In Future Europe 
C 122 (2003)  Glen Camp 
The End of the Cold War and US-EU-Relations 
C 123 (2003)  Finn Laursen / Berenice L. Laursen 
The Danish Presidency 2002: Completing the Circle from Copenhagen to  
Copenhagen 
C 124 (2003)  ZEI (Hrsg.) 
Der Verfassungsentwurf des EU-Konvents. Bewertung der Strukturentscheidungen
C 125 (2003)  Hans-Christian Maner 
Multiple Identitäten – Der Blick des orthodoxen Südosteuropa auf „Europa“ 
C 126 (2003)  Janko Prunk 
Die rationalistische Zivilisation 
C 127 (2003)  Władysław Bartoszewski 
Europas Identität nach der Osterweiterung 
C 128 (2003) 
 
 
 
Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou 
The 2003 Hellenic Presidency of the European Union. 
Mediterranean Perspectives on the ESDP C 129 (2004)  Fritz Hellwig 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 130 (2004)  Thorsten Faas / Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The Difference Between Real And Potential Power: Voting Power, Attendance and 
Cohesion 
C 131 (2004)  Andreas Jacobs (ed.) 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: enlarging and widening the perspective 
C 132 (2004)  Ludger Kühnhardt / Gabor Erdödy / Christoph Böhr 
L’Europa centrale fra le culture politiche nazionali tradizionali ed una nuova 
identità europea 
C 133 (2004)  Hubert Iral 
Wartesaal oder Intensivstation? Zur Lage der EU nach der gescheiterten Regie-
rungskonferenz  
C 134 (2004)  Nicole Groß 
Netzwerkbildung in der EU als regionale Standortpolitik? Nordrhein-Westfalen und 
die transnationalen Beziehungen zu Regionen im Benelux-Raum sowie in Mittel- 
und Osteuropa 
C 135 (2004) 
 
Karl-Heinz Narjes 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 136 (2004) 
 
Ludger Kühnhardt 
The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration. European Experience and World-
wide Trends 
C 137 (2004)  Andreas Marchetti (ed.) 
The CSCE as a Model to Transform Western Relations with the Greater Middle 
East 
C 138 (2004)  Lothar Rühl 
Conditions for a European intervention strategy in application of the ESDP and 
US/Nato crisis management 
C 139 (2004)  Hubert Iral 
Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Normalzustand und Legitimationsfragen. Die Wahlen 
zum Europäischen Parlament 2004 vor dem Hintergrund der EU-Erweiterung und 
des Verfassungsgebungsprozesses 
C 140 (2004)  Franz-Josef Meiers 
Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections. From Rift to Harmony? 
C 141 (2004)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
From National Identity to European Constitutionalism. European Integration: The 
first fifty years 
C 142 (2005)  Ashkaan Rahimi 
The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
C 143 (2005)  Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.) 
The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations 
C 144 (2005)  Hansjörg Eiff 
Zum Problem des Kosovo-Status 
C 145 (2005)  Miguel E. Cárdenas / Christian Arnold 
La experiencia de la Unión Europea y sus anécdotas para la «Comunidad Andina 
de Naciones» (CAN) 
C 146 (2005)  Franjo Štiblar 
Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
C 147 (2005)  Erol Esen 
Grundzüge der Kommunalverwaltung und die europäische Integration der Türkei. 
Strukturen, Aufgaben und Standpunkte 
C 148 (2005)  Jürgen Elvert 
Zur gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Europäischen Union. Einige Überlegungen aus 
geschichtswissenschaftlicher Sicht 
C 149 (2005)  Matti Wiberg 
New Winners and Old Losers. A Priori Voting Power in the EU25 
 C 150 (2005)  Siebo M. H. Janssen 
Belgien – Modell für eine föderal verfasste EU? Die Föderalisierung Belgiens im 
Kontext der Europäischen Integration 
C 151 (2005)  Geert-Hinrich Ahrens 
Die Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Ukraine. Die schwierige Mission der OSZE/ 
ODIHR-Wahlbeobachter (August 2004 bis Januar 2005) 
C 152 (2005)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration. The Interests of the European 
Union 
C 153 (2005)  Martin Zimmek 
Integrationsprozesse in Lateinamerika. Aktuelle Herausforderungen in Mittelameri-
ka und der Andenregion 
C 154 (2005)  Andreas Marchetti (ed.) 
Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Defining European Interests for the 
Next Decade 
C 155 (2006)  Valeria Marziali 
Lobbying in Brussels. Interest Representation and Need for Information 
C 156 (2006)  Nina Eschke / Thomas Malick (eds.) 
The European Constitution and its Ratification Crisis. Constitutional Debates in the 
EU Member States 
C 157 (2006)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
European Integration: Challenge and Response. Crises as Engines of Progress in 
European Integration History 
C 158 (2006)  Andreas Marchetti 
The European Neighbourhood Policy. Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery 
C 159 (2006)  Thomas Demmelhuber 
The Euro-Mediterranean Space as an Imagined (Geo-)political, Economic and 
Cultural Entity 
C 160 (2006)  Emil Mintchev / Janusz Musial 
Stabilität durch Bildung. Die Fortbildungsprojekte des “Zentrum für Europäische 
Integrationsforschung” (ZEI) in Südosteuropa (1999 – 2006) 
C 161 (2006)  Jürgen Mittag 
Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? Perspectives of Parliamentary Par-
ticipation in European Security and Defence Policy 
C 162 (2006)  Cordula Janowski 
Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU. Pleadings for a Broader Perspec-
tive 
C 163 (2006)  Swetlana W. Pogorelskaja 
Die Bedeutung der deutschen parteinahen Stiftungen für die EU-Politik gegenüber 
den MOE- und GUS-Staaten 
C 164 (2006)  Wolfram Hilz 
Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007. Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwie-
rigen Zeiten 
C 165 (2006)  Franz-Josef Meiers 
Zwischen Partnerschaft und Widerspruch. Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehun-
gen seit dem 11. September 2001 
C 166 (2006)  Christiana Tings 
The new German European Policy. Challenges to Decentralised EU Policy Coordi-
nation 
C 167 (2007)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa neu begründen 
C 168 (2007)  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean. The Need of Reconstruc-
tion of Policy-Making 
C 169 (2007)  Ariane Kösler 
The Southern African Development Community and its Relations to the European 
Union. Deepening Integration in Southern Africa? 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) wurde 1995 als selbständig arbei-
tende, interdisziplinäre Forschungseinrichtung an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
Bonn gegründet. In Forschung, Lehre und Politikberatung sowie im Dialog zwischen Wissen-
schaft und Praxis beteiligt sich das ZEI an der Lösung bisher unbewältigter Probleme der europä-
ischen Einigung und der Gestaltung der Rolle Europas in der Welt. Weitere Informationen finden 
Sie auf unserer Homepage im Internet: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS richten sich mit ihren von Wissenschaftlern und politischen Akteuren 
verfaßten Beiträgen an Wissenschaft, Politik und Publizistik. Jeder Beitrag unterliegt einem inter-
nen Auswahlverfahren und einer externen Begutachtung. Gleichwohl gibt er die persönliche Mei-
nung der Autoren wieder. Die Beiträge fassen häufig Ergebnisse aus laufenden Forschungspro-
jekten zusammen. Die aktuelle Liste finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: http://www.zei.de. 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) was established in 1995 as an independ-
ent, interdisciplinary research institute at the University of Bonn. With research, teaching and 
political consultancy ZEI takes part in an intensive dialogue between scholarship and society in 
contributing to the resolution of problems of European integration and the development of 
Europe´s global role. For further information, see: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS are intended to stimulate discussion among researchers, practitioners 
and policy makers on current and emerging issues of European integration and Europe´s global 
role. Each paper has been exposed to an internal discussion within the Center for European Inte-
gration Studies (ZEI) and an external peer review. The papers mostly reflect work in progress. 
For a current list, see the center‘s homepage: http://www.zei.de. 